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Resolving the Circuit Split: Pleading 
Healthcare Fraud with Particularity 
Tricia L. Forte* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 2018 fiscal year, the Department of Justice collected $2.8 
billion from settlements and judgments involving fraudulent and 
false claims against the government.1  $2.5 billion of that sum was 
attributable to fraudulent billing in the healthcare industry.2  The 
False Claims Act (FCA) is the government’s primary tool to address 
issues of fraudulent and false claims.3  One of the principal uses of 
the FCA is to address false claims submitted to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) by healthcare providers.4  
The statute grants authority to private citizens, often called 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2020; Suffolk University Sawyer School of Business, Master of Business 
Administration, 2009.  Visiting Instructor, Providence College, Health Policy 
& Management Department.  Thank you, Professor Susan Heyman, for your 
guidance and thoughtful suggestions throughout the writing process.  A special 
thank you to my family for their love and encouragement, especially my 
husband, Michael, and my son, Mikey.  Also, thank you to my mentor, Dr. 
Robert B. Hackey, who inspired my love of health policy and encouraged me 
through every step of my career. 
1. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers




3. Martin Merritt & Rachel V. Rose, Pleading “Healthcare Fraud and
Abuse” Under the False Claims Act, 60 FED. LAW., May 2013, at 62, 63. 
4. Sara A. Smoter, Note, Relaxing Rule 9(b): Why False Claims Act
Relators Should Be Held to a Flexible Pleading Standard, 66 CASE WESTERN
RES. L. REV. 235, 238 (2015). 
2020] FALSE CLAIMS ACT 17 
relators (or whistleblowers), to file qui tam claims reporting 
attempts to defraud the government.5  Qui tam claims account for 
the majority of FCA litigation.6  Such claims, however, are often 
difficult to plead because they are subject to the heightened 
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP).7 
There is a circuit split regarding pleading standards under 
Rule 9(b) which has resulted in different outcomes depending on 
where the suit is brought as to whether the case is allowed to 
proceed.8  Notably, the First,9 Fourth10 and Eleventh Circuits11 
apply a strict standard for qui tam claims, while other circuits apply 
a more lenient standard.12  Courts in circuits that dismiss these qui 
tam actions before even preliminary discovery can occur may be 
depriving the government of recovery of funds.  Dismissal of claims 
prior to discovery is contradictory to public policy as the 
government, through CMS, is meant to pay only medical claims 
that are legitimate and necessary.  By denying the potential for 
recoupment of these funds, the government is wastefully spending 
resources to pay for healthcare that is either not needed or that 
never even occurred.  CMS states, “[a]lthough no precise measure 
of health care fraud exists, those who exploit federal health care 
programs can cost taxpayers billions of dollars while putting 
beneficiaries’ health and welfare at risk.”13  If a provider bills for 
services that were never provided or “up-codes” services by billing 
at an inflated rate, taxpayers suffer monetarily.  A more egregious 
situation occurs if a provider is overutilizing care, resulting in a 
5. Id. at 238, 238 n.12; Merritt & Rose, supra note 3, at 63.
6. Merritt & Rose, supra note 3, at 63.
7. Id. at 63–64.
8. Smoter, supra note 4, at 241.
9. Id. at 243–44, 244 n.47; e.g., United States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm.
Co., 737 F.3d 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2004). 
10. Smoter, supra note 4, at 243; e.g., United States ex rel. Nathan v.
Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 457–58 (4th Cir. 2013). 
11. Smoter, supra note 4, at 241–43, 242 n.35; e.g., United States ex rel.
Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). 
12. Smoter, supra note 4, at 244–48.
13. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE:
PREVENT, DETECT, REPORT 4 (2019), https://www.cms.gov/outreach-and-
education/medicare-learning-network-MLN/MLNproducts/downloads/fraud-
abuse-MLN4649244.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3QJ-KRRG]. 
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patient suffering physically and emotionally, in addition to 
taxpayers suffering monetarily.   
For those reasons, it is in the best interest of the government, 
taxpayers, and healthcare consumers to allow credible qui tam 
claims to survive, at least through the discovery phase.  After 
studying both the most stringent and the most lenient jurisdictions, 
this Article will suggest a solution to the circuit split.  This solution 
offers an alternative means for resolving qui tam claims.  That 
solution would take the form of an amendment to the FCA that 
would allow for administrative organizations to step in where the 
government decides not to pursue a qui tam claim or where a court 
dismisses a qui tam claim before it can be fully heard.  Such an 
approach would better protect innocent healthcare organizations 
and providers from unnecessary litigation while bringing entities 
engaged in fraudulent billing practices to task for their unlawful 
conduct. 
Part I of this Article will lay out the law of the FCA, qui tam 
actions, and relevant provisions of the FRCP.  Part II will provide 
a discussion of how the current law poses problems of pleading 
fraud with particularity for qui tam relators with representative 
examples from both strict and lenient circuits.  Part III will discuss 
solutions that scholars have put forth to resolve the problem and 
advance this author’s alternative solution.  Finally, this Article will 
conclude by providing a summary of this important and timely 
problem. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. The False Claims Act
For the government to successfully recoup funding from a
healthcare organization or provider, it must find evidence that the 
provider or organization violated the FCA.14  Examples of 
violations include billing for services that a patient did not receive 
or overbilling for services that were provided, but not to the degree 
of accuracy as stated in the claim.15   
14. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
15. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., supra note 13, at 7; see Michael
W. Youtt et al., False Claims Act Actions–The Developing Case Law Regarding
if and When Opinions of Medical Necessity Can Be Fraudulent, 27 HEALTH 
LAW., Apr. 2015, at 36, 36.
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The first category of claims that the FCA covers are “factually 
false” claims, which impose liability on “any person who . . . 
knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent 
claim for payment or approval.”16  The FCA defines “knowing” and 
“knowingly,” in respect to a person with information, as “[one who] 
(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” and
“require[s] no proof of specific intent to defraud.”17  It is important
to recognize the wide spectrum of knowledge that qualifies under
the statute, from actual knowledge to a reckless disregard for the
truth, or even conscious avoidance of the truth.  Additionally, intent
to defraud is not required, which allows for significantly more
claims than if the statute included a scienter element.  Section
3729(a)(1)(A) is useful in litigation involving providers “padding”
their bills with services that they never rendered, since the action
need be predicated only on the actual submission of these “factually
false” claims.
The second category of claims that the FCA covers are “legally 
false” claims.18  The statute imposes liability on “any person who 
. . . knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”19  The 
FCA defines “material” as “having a natural tendency to influence, 
or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or 
property.”20  This section of the legislation is illustrated in United 
States ex. rel. Mikes v. Straus, where a pulmonologist pursued a 
claim against a physician practice for failing to calibrate a piece of 
machinery, rendering their tests so unreliable as to be “false.”21  
These “legally false” claims are common in the healthcare industry. 
16. § 3729(a)(1)(A); see also United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l
Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In a run-of-the mill 
‘factually false’ case, proving falsehood is relatively straightforward: A relator 
must generally show that the government payee has submitted ‘an incorrect 
description of goods or services provided or a request for reimbursement for 
goods or services never provided.’”). 
17. § 3729(b)(1).
18. Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217.
19. § 3729(a)(1)(B).
20. § 3729(b)(4).
21. 274 F.3d 687, 692–93 (2d Cir. 2001).
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Lastly, the statute provides for additional damages when one 
“knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or 
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
Government.”22  That occurs when providers or organizations 
discover that they have incorrectly or mistakenly billed CMS and 
do not initiate a refund process back to the government in a prompt 
manner. If a provider is found liable, the statute allows the 
government to recover a civil penalty plus treble damages for the 
loss which the government sustained as a result of the provider’s 
actions.23  That portion of the statute was reinforced as the “reverse 
false claims act” provision within the Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009.24  Additionally, the passage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 set parameters to 
ensure that any falsely billed claims, upon identification, were to be 
returned within sixty days of discovery of the overpayment.25 
B. Qui Tam Actions
While the United States government has significant resources,
its dependence on private citizens to effectively police corporations 
is demonstrated in section 3730, entitled “Civil Actions for False 
Claims.”  To assist in gauging the vast scope of these claims, the 
Department of Justice reported that recovery from qui tam actions 
related to healthcare under the FCA in 2018 amounted to over $2.1 
billion of the $2.8 billion collected for all FCA claims.26  Of that 
amount, relators earned approximately $301 million in 645 qui tam 
actions.27   
Qui tam relators are often referred to as “whistleblowers,” as 
the information that they assert and provide to the government as 
the basis of their claims often comes from their relationship with a 
former or current employer.28  The statute permits a relator to 
bring a civil action for a violation of the FCA in his or her name and 
22. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
23. Id.
24. Youtt et al., supra note 15, at 36.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7k(d)(2) (2012).
26. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 1.
27. Id.
28. Brianna Bloodgood, Comment, Particularity Discovery in Qui Tam
Actions: A Middle Ground Approach to Pleading Fraud in the Health Care 
Sector, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (2017). 
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on behalf of the government.29  The relator’s action is filed in 
camera with the court and sealed for at least sixty days to allow the 
government adequate time to review the claim.30  The government 
may decide to take the case and formally prosecute, utilizing its own 
resources to pursue the claim.31  If the government decides to not 
take up the case and does not recommend dismissal to the court, 
the relator is free to pursue the claim using his or her own resources 
(funding, attorney guidance, etc.).32   
The monetary motives for relators seeing successful claims 
through to judgment cannot be ignored.  Under section 3730(d), 
depending on the relator’s status—ranging from mere informant to 
a wrongdoer who has turned himself over to the authorities—
relators stand to gain between ten and twenty-five percent of the 
total damages recouped by the government.  As the FCA authorizes 
penalties per claim in the amount of “not less than $5,000 and not 
more than $10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which 
the government sustains because of the act of that person,” it is 
apparent why qui tam lawsuits are a popular means of ferreting out 
fraud.33  Compensation for risk is also appropriate when a relator’s 
claim is pursued either by the government or the relator, especially 
when the relator is a current employee.34  There are protections for 
“whistleblowers” as outlined in section 3730(h), providing for 
additional compensation for lost wages and damages if the 
whistleblower lost his or her job or suffered discrimination at his or 
her employment site. 
C. Pleading Standards Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
At the complaint stage, most civil claims need only comply with 
FRCP Rule 8(a) which states that the complainant must assert “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012).
30. § 3730(b)(2).
31. § 3730(b)(4)(A).
32. § 3730(b)(1), (b)(4)(B).
33. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
34. Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam
Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 813, 818–19 
(2012).   
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entitled to relief.”35  In federal courts, the scope of Rule 8(a) has 
been further defined by the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.  Twombly 
dealt with potential collusion in the telecommunications industry 
in a claim brought by subscribers to telecommunications services.36  
Effectively, the Supreme Court stated that all of the details of the 
claim need not be known at the time of pleading, but enough facts 
must be present so that it is “plausible” that the fraudulent conduct 
could have occurred. 37  Thus, Twombly established the plausibility 
standard of pleading.38 
Further elucidating the meaning of “plausibility,” the Supreme 
Court again took up this issue in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, in the context of 
the deprivation of constitutional liberties for a prisoner in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.39  The 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Iqbal stated that “[w]hile legal 
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must 
be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded 
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to 
relief.”40 
When pleading a fraud-related claim under the FCA, 
complainants must also comply with the heightened pleading 
requirements articulated in FRCP Rule 9.  Specifically, Rule 9(b) 
states, in relevant part, that: “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party 
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake.”41  Accordingly, a relator must comply with pleading 
requirements of both Rules 8 and 9.  However, this raises the 
question of just how much “particularity” is necessary at the 
pleading stage.  Further complicating this issue, the circuits are 
split on interpreting “particularity” as it relates to qui tam 
litigation in healthcare.   
  Thus, when a relator brings a qui tam action under the FCA, 
it is not enough to assert fraud generally, but rather the complaint 
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
36. 550 U.S. 544, 550–51 (2007).
37. Id. at 556.
38. Id. at 544.
39. 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
40. Id. at 679.
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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must contain plausible factual assertions that support the legal 
allegations.  Regardless of whether the pleading standards have 
been met in an FCA qui tam action, the likelihood of the complaint 
withstanding a motion to dismiss depends largely upon the circuit 
in which the action was filed.   
II. THE PROBLEM OF QUI TAM PLEADING WITH PARTICULARITY
Each circuit court has chosen either a strict or  lenient standard
when deciding whether to allow qui tam relator claims to proceed 
to discovery, leading to widely varied and inconsistent results.42  
For qui tam relators, the strict standard poses a unique challenge 
in their attempts to have their cases heard before a court.43  The 
Supreme Court has denied writs of certiorari to resolve this circuit 
split. Consequently, it is important to understand the different 
approaches that circuit courts use in deciding these difficult 
cases.44   
A. Circuit Courts that Apply Stringent Rule 9(b) Pleading
Standards
Circuits that strictly apply the Rule 9(b) standard45 maintain 
that the Rule “require[s] a relator’s complaint to identify 
representative samples of the allegedly false claims.”46  The 
rationale motivating this strict approach is that it protects the 
defendant’s reputation in the market against vexatious claims and 
deters qui tam relators from making frivolous claims if they know 
there is little chance of success.47  Additionally, some argue that 
“[m]eritless FCA suits impose significant financial burdens on the 
taxpayer by wasting the [Department of Justice]’s investigative 
resources and increasing the costs of government programs and 
contracts.”48  Merely stating that a relator knows of a scheme or 
fraud without more detailed information will most likely not 
42. Smoter, supra note 4, at 237.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See cases cited supra notes 9–11.
46. See Michael Lockman, Comment, In Defense of a Strict Pleading
Standard for False Claims Act Whistleblowers, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1559, 1559–
60 (2015). 
47. Id. at 1566.
48. Id. at 1567.
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survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by the defendant in those 
circuits that take a stricter approach to Rule 9(b) pleading 
standards.49 
In one of the most cited cases on this topic, United States ex rel. 
Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the district court’s opinion that the relator did not plead 
enough facts with particularity to allow the claim to pass to the 
discovery phase.50  The relator, Jeffrey Clausen, was not an 
employee of the defendant Laboratory Corporation of America, Inc. 
(LabCorp), but “identified himself as a current competitor” in the 
laboratory industry.51  Clausen alleged in his complaint that 
LabCorp, which provided diagnostic services to patients residing in 
long-term care facilities, was fraudulently billing Medicare.52  To 
support his allegations, he stated that he had knowledge of six 
different schemes in which LabCorp was receiving funds from 
Medicare that were inappropriate, including: standing orders for 
laboratory tests that were not ordered by physicians; random draws 
for laboratory tests without a physician’s order; unbundling of blood 
testing to allow for duplicative billing; charging multiple times for 
travel to long-term care facilities where multiple patients were seen 
on the same service date; and for patients with multiple co-
morbidities, charging for the same test multiple times 
corresponding to each chronic condition, despite the test only being 
performed once.53  Clausen filed an initial complaint, followed by 
two amended complaints, both of which were dismissed by the 
district court, thus prompting Clausen to appeal to the Eleventh 
Circuit.54   
The initial complaint failed to “identify any [long-term care 
facilities] by name, include any documentary exhibits or explain the 
origin of its information,” and eventually, after conducting its own 
investigation, the government “declined to intervene.”55  Clausen 
proceeded to file his first amended complaint, which included 
further details, such as information regarding conversations 
49. See id. at 1570.
50. 290 F.3d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002).
51. Id. at 1302–03.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1303.
54. Id. at 1302.
55. Id. at 1303–04.
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between Clausen and LabCorp employees (identified by specific 
names) regarding LabCorp policies, codes that would have been 
used falsely by LabCorp to bill the government, and the medical 
history of three patients in two named facilities.56  Nevertheless, 
the district court dismissed count one of the complaint, finding that 
Clausen failed to meet the pleading standard under Rule 9(b), thus 
requiring him to file a second amended complaint.57  Clausen’s 
second amended complaint included more detailed information 
concerning the three patients identified in the first amended 
complaint and a blank claim form that was routinely used to bill 
the government for services rendered to patients.58  The district 
court subsequently granted LabCorp’s second motion to dismiss, 
stating that Clausen’s amended complaint “‘suffer[ed] from the 
same defect as the [First] Amended Complaint’ in that it did not 
‘identif[y] a single fraudulent claim by date filed, amount or claim 
number that was actually submitted to the government.’”59  
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s 
decision to dismiss Clausen’s complaint.60  The court explained 
that, in order to allow the claim to pass through to the discovery 
phase, a pleading must contain facts alleging statements or 
documents that were made in pursuit of the fraud, the time and 
place of those statements, the person or persons responsible for 
making the statements or composing the documents, the manner in 
which the statements or documents misled the government to 
induce payment, and what the defendants gained by making the 
false statements.61  The court further stated that “Clausen merely 
offer[ed] conclusory statements, and [did] not adequately allege 
when—or even if—the schemes were brought to fruition.”62  Hence, 
the Eleventh Circuit took a firm stance regarding pleading 
healthcare fraud with particularity, setting a high bar for qui tam 
relators. 
56. Id. at 1304.
57. Id. at 1305.
58. Id. at 1305–06, 1306 n.10.
59. Id. at 1306–07.
60. Id. at 1315.
61. See id. at 1310 (citing Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194,
1202 (11th Cir. 2001) and United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Fla., 19 F.3d 562, 567–68 (11th Cir. 1994)).  
62. Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1312.
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  The Fourth Circuit reached a similar result in United States 
ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmacies North America, Inc.  There, 
Noah Nathan, a sales manager for the pharmaceutical company 
Takeda Pharmaceuticals (Takeda), brought a qui tam action under 
the FCA.63  Nathan provided three amended complaints pursuant 
to the court’s requests which alleged that Takeda employed 
marketing tactics that ultimately led to the government paying for 
prescriptions that were inappropriately prescribed to patients.64  
Nathan asserted that sales representatives were encouraged to 
promote a newly approved gastrointestinal drug, Kapidex, to 
physicians who did not regularly prescribe this type of drug, thus 
encouraging “off-label” use that could not be reimbursed.65  He also 
asserted that sales representatives only provided samples of the 
sixty milligram tablet of Kapidex to physicians, despite the fact that 
the thirty milligram tablet was FDA-approved for a more common 
condition, and without considering whether the thirty milligram 
tablet was better suited to each physician’s needs.66  In short, 
Nathan alleged that Takeda effectively induced the government to 
pay for prescription claims that were technically not reimbursable 
in violation of the FCA.67 
The district court dismissed Nathan’s complaint in response to 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by Takeda.68  The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, stating that “when a defendant’s 
actions, as alleged and as reasonably inferred from the allegations, 
could have led, but need not necessarily have led, to the submission 
of false claims, a relator must allege with particularity that specific 
false claims actually were presented to the government for 
payment.”69  While the suit seemed plausible on its face (which 
would allow the suit to meet the Rule 8(a) standard), the court 
mentioned various ways in which the relator’s argument failed to 
meet the heightened Rule 9(b) standard, namely that even though 
Nathan had supplied the court with numbers of prescriptions 
written or filled, he did not provide the diagnoses associated with 
63. 707 F.3d 451, 453 (4th Cir. 2013).




68. Id. at 453.
69. Id. at 457.
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each prescription, which was required to validate the doses.70  The 
court was unwilling to allow the claim to proceed to discovery based 
on inferences “draw[n] . . . from general facts.”71   
Both the Clausen and Nathan opinions led to the dismissal of 
qui tam actions and are used to illustrate how some courts apply a 
strict standard to Rule 9(b) pleadings. 
B. Circuit Courts that Apply Lenient Rule 9(b) Pleading
Standards
On the other side of the split, courts allow a more lenient 
application of the Rule 9(b) standard.  These circuits require 
pleading fraud with particularity without specific details, which 
can be accomplished when the pleading is supported by “reliable 
indicia” that bolsters the inference that a healthcare provider 
supplied false claims to the government.72  This standard is flexible 
enough to allow claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in order to 
accomplish the true purpose of the FCA—capture providers that are 
defrauding the government.  Knowledge of the scheme, as well as 
the indicia of reliability, allows relators to pursue and recoup 
funding that was incorrectly and fraudulently paid to healthcare 
organizations or providers not deserving of the reimbursement. 
In Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management, LLC, the Third 
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of a Rule 
12(b)(6)motion.73  In that case, Thomas Foglia, a registered nurse 
at Renal Ventures from 2007 to 2008, alleged that Renal Ventures 
was not in compliance with quality regulations and was charging 
Medicare inappropriately as a result.74  The complaint centered 
around the use of the drug Zemplar, which at the time was available 
in three different vial sizes.75  Renal Ventures exclusively used the 
5 mcg single-use vials for its patients with chronic kidney disease.76  
When using the 5 mcg vials, most patients did not require the full 
dose in the vial, leaving the remaining product to be discarded at 
70. See id. at 459–60.
71. Id. at 460.
72. E.g., United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190
(5th Cir. 2009).  
73. 754 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 2014).
74. See id. at 155.
75. Id. at 157.
76. Id.
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the directive of the manufacturer.77  Even though the whole vial 
was not used, Renal Ventures nevertheless billed Medicare for the 
whole vial.78  If the unused portion of the drug was discarded, this 
practice would have fallen within the acceptable use standards for 
the medication.79  However, Foglia alleged that the unused product 
was not discarded, but rather it was “harvested” for other 
patients—leading Renal Ventures to charge Medicare for the full 
vial—while actually only using portions and taking advantage of 
the remainder.80  Foglia supported these allegations with his 
testimony as well as with medication logs that showed, given 
patient volume, approximately fifty vials should have been used 
each day (with the overage discarded), but instead only twenty-nine 
to thirty-five vials were being used each day.81  Even though the 
district court found that this information did not comply with the 
particularity standards required by Rule 9(b), the Third Circuit 
stated that it would follow the approach used by the First, Fifth, 
and Ninth Circuits; that is, “it is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege 
‘particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with 
reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were 
actually submitted.’”82  On these grounds, the court reasoned that 
there were enough facts to allow the case to proceed to discovery, 
showing a clear divergence from those circuits that apply a more 
stringent standard.83  
The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach in United States ex 
rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti.84  Dr. Grubbs, a psychiatrist, alleged 
that the Chairman of the Medical Staff of the hospital’s Psychiatric 
Subsection and several other doctors were involved in a scheme to 
defraud Medicare.85  The alleged fraud arose when the doctors 
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id.  The Department of Health and Human Services did allow for
multiple use of vials, but only under certain conditions that Renal Ventures 
was not meeting.  Id.   
80. Id.
81. Id. at 158.
82. Id. at 156–157 (citing Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d
993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) and United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 
565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
83. See id. at 158.
84. 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009).
85. Id.
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would record “face-to-face physician visits that had not occurred 
and that were based solely on information obtained through 
nursing contacts with the patients.”86  Upon reporting that practice 
to the general hospital administrator, Dr. Grubbs was dismissed 
and the alleged fraudulent billing practices continued.87  Dr. 
Grubbs filed a qui tam action in which he asserted at least one 
distinct false claim for each physician involved in the fraud.88  The 
district court held that the evidence of fraud presented by Dr. 
Grubbs was insufficient to satisfy the  particularity requirement set 
forth under Rule 9(b).89 
The Fifth Circuit reversed, allowing Dr. Grubbs to advance his 
suit against the hospital and doctors involved.  The court recognized 
the traditional judicial construct that a relator’s pleading must 
include “the time, place, and contents of the false representation[], 
as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation 
and what that person obtained thereby.”90  However, the court also 
acknowledged that “Rule 9(b)’s ultimate meaning is context-
specific.”91  Ultimately, the court concluded that strict adherence to 
the traditional construct would make it exceedingly difficult for a 
Rule 9(b) pleading to move forward, which would be contrary to the 
spirit of the FCA.92   
The Fifth Circuit, through Grubbs, adopted a flexible pleading 
standard under Rule 9(b), stating that “a relator’s complaint, if it 
cannot allege the details of an actually submitted false claim, may 
nevertheless survive by alleging particular details of a scheme to 
submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong 
inference that claims were actually submitted.”93 Under this 
approach, Dr. Grubbs’s claims against the doctors were permitted 
to  move forward, but the claim against the hospital was dismissed 
because the billing originated from the doctors and the hospital 
 86. Id. at 184.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 184–85.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 188. (quoting United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare
Mgmt. Grp., 193 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
91. Id. (quoting Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir.
1997)). 
92. Id. at 190.
93. Id.
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lacked the requisite intent for liability under the FCA.94  Most 
importantly, the court in Grubbs recognized that allowing claims to 
move forward both permits qui tam relators to access, through 
discovery, the particular information required to adequately plead 
their claims (i.e., billing records, clinical records, etc.), while 
protecting organizations and providers from frivolous litigation by 
scrutinizing each relator claim to ensure plausibility.95 
A similar scenario on a much grander scale occurred in the oft-
cited Eighth Circuit case, United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned 
Parenthood of the Heartland.96  Susan Thayer was a center 
manager at Planned Parenthood’s Storm Lake, Iowa location from 
1991 to 2008, and served as a center manager for a second location 
in Iowa for four years during this time.97  Thayer alleged that 
Planned Parenthood (operating seventeen clinics in Iowa) engaged 
in the following schemes: obtaining reimbursement from Medicaid 
for contraceptives that were prescribed without a necessary 
examination or were not actually received by patients; obtaining 
prohibited reimbursements based on federal law for abortion 
services; filing claims for services that had already been paid for by 
philanthropic funding; and “upcoding” for services.98  While the 
district court dismissed Thayer’s claim for failure to meet the Rule 
9(b) standard, the Eighth Circuit reversed.99 
The Eighth Circuit looked to both the allegations that Thayer 
brought in her claim and the base of knowledge that she acquired 
as an employee and manager during her lengthy tenure with 
Planned Parenthood.100  The court found that Thayer had satisfied 
the heightened pleading requirement because she identified the 
names of Planned Parenthood employees who directed her 
participation in these schemes, the time period during which the 
schemes were carried out (two years), the actual clinics that 
94. Id. at 191–92.
95. See id. at 191.
96. 765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014).
97. Id. at 915.
98. Id. at 915–16.  “Upcoding” is a process by which a medical facility
“file[s] claims for more expensive services than were actually performed.”  Id. 
at 916.  
99. Id. at 915.
100. See id. at 917, 919.
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participated in the billing schemes, and the methods used to 
achieve the object of the schemes.101 
In its discussion, the court noted that the Eighth Circuit does 
not require a representative sample approach whereby a relator 
must cite specific instances of fraud within his or her complaint.102  
Instead, the court stated that “to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity 
requirement, ‘the complaint must plead such facts as the time, 
place, and content of the defendant’s false representations, as well 
as the details of the defendant’s fraudulent acts, including when the 
acts occurred, who engaged in them, and what was obtained as a 
result.’”103  Given Thayer’s long tenure with Planned Parenthood, 
access to and management of the billing and claims system, and 
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the organization, her 
complaint satisfied the court’s standard for particularity.104  
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Pleading fraud with particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) in 
relation to the FCA is a subject that has been discussed at length 
in several law journal articles and the cases themselves.105  The 
Supreme Court has denied at least three writs of certiorari from 
plaintiffs attempting to resolve the confusion regarding what, in 
fact, is a sufficiently well-pleaded complaint from a qui tam relator 
in the healthcare forum.106  There are three approaches of note that 
have been advanced but have not yet been adopted by the courts. 
The first approach proposes that when two medical professionals 
disagree on the medically appropriate course of treatment, there 
cannot be a false claim.107  Disagreement about care that yields a 
claim billed to CMS is not a sufficient basis for a qui tam suit so 
long as both courses of treatment are reasonable in relation to what 
101. Id. at 919.
102. See id. at 918 (quoting United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565
F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)).
103. Id. at 916–17 (quoting United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 
Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
104. See id. at 917.
105. See generally Grubbs, 565 F.3d 180; United States ex rel. Clausen v.
Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002); Bloodgood, supra note 28; 
Smoter, supra note 4. 
106. Lockman, supra note 46, at 1560.
107. Youtt et al., supra note 15, at 43.
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is in the best interest of the patient.108 The second approach 
advances a more moderate pleading standard rather than the 
inflexible approach applied by courts such as the Eleventh 
Circuit.109  The last approach advocates for relators to have the 
opportunity for discovery prior to advancing their claim, which 
would allow them to meet the particularity pleading standard.110 
Recognizing the limitations inherent in these approaches, this 
Article will propose a solution that diverts from a purely judicial 
remedy handled strictly within the courts.  The proposal includes 
the usage of administrative government agencies to pursue qui tam 
actions in lieu of the court system, thus requiring a change to the 
FCA.   
A. Existing Proposed Solutions
For attorney-scholars Robison, Thomas, and Youtt, one of the
problems giving rise to the circuit split relates to claims regarding 
differing opinions of medical necessity; different circuits appear to 
have contradictory understandings of when pleadings are sufficient 
to demonstrate lack of medical necessity.111  In their view, any 
claim that does not fall into the category of medical necessity—that 
is, billing patients for services they do not need—should remain 
subject to the FCA.112  However, depending on provider preference, 
knowledge, and skill, as well as patient autonomy, what is 
considered medically necessary may vary.113  For example, two 
physicians reasonably disagreeing on a course of treatment does not 
necessarily render that treatment objectively false in violation of 
the FCA.114  Courts agree that cases involving claims arising from 
incorrect or negligent medical acts are not actionable under the 
FCA.115  In those instances, a physician who supported a course of 
treatment that was actually wrong for the patient or carried out the 
treatment negligently is not violating the FCA so long as the 
108. See id. at 38 (quoting United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA,
498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 65, n. 29 (D.D.C. 2007)). 
109. See Smoter, supra note 4, at 236–37.
110. Bloodgood, supra note 28, at 1435–36.
111. See Youtt et al., supra note 15, at 40.
112. See id. at 37.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 38.
115. See id.
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provider acted with the reasonable belief that the service was 
necessary, and not in a manner that amounts to knowingly 
defrauding the government.116  Thus, as long as a provider does not 
knowingly defraud the government, the provider does not violate 
the FCA where reasonable medical minds may differ over the 
proposed course of treatment.117 
While that is a well-reasoned suggestion for courts evaluating 
FCA claims, it only addresses one type of claim under the FCA.  The 
unnecessary treatment or services rendered to a patient is only one 
of the potential ways a provider could defraud the government. 
Those types of claims are not part of a greater scheme to defraud 
the government such as the scheme in Foglia, where there was clear 
abuse of billing for medications.118  They address only cases where 
there is a difference of opinion, not a difference in treatment 
standards, which will not cover the majority of FCA claims. 
The second argument that has been advanced is one that is 
critical of the “representative samples” approach, where a qui tam 
relator provides a CMS claim, or evidence of a CMS claim 
submission, that the court can use to substantiate the pleadings.119  
Supporters of this approach assert that those relators who file in 
districts that strictly adhere to the representative sample approach 
may be deprived of their day in court, as they may not have access 
to the documents that would provide the representative sample 
needed for the court to find enough particularity in the 
complaint.120  Additionally, for those qui tam relators who do have 
evidence on hand, a more flexible approach will not be detrimental 
to their case.121  In lieu of the representative samples approach, 
this theory mimics the approach that the more lenient circuits have 
adopted to decide whether a qui tam complaint meets the Rule 9(b) 
threshold.122 Proponent of this approach assert that “[w]hen 
116. See id.; see also Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., F. Supp. 2d 1034,
1047 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“The requisite intent [under the FCA] is the knowing 
presentation of what is known to be false, as opposed to innocent mistakes or 
mere negligence.”).   
117. See Youtt et al., supra note 15, at 38.
118. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2014).
119. See Lockman, supra, note 46, at 1559-60.
120. See Smoter, supra note 4, at 245.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 259.
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evaluating a relator’s complaint, every court should consider 
whether the relator sufficiently alleged: (1) details of the overall 
fraudulent scheme and (2) indicia of reliability.”123  Because this 
method has already been adopted by the lenient circuit courts,124 it 
does nothing to resolve the existing circuit split.  
A final proposed solution—which perhaps may be the least 
disruptive—is to set a pleading standard that allows for a limited, 
court-controlled discovery process after the filing of a relator 
complaint.125  This solution would allow a limited pretrial discovery 
period conducted under court-imposed parameters giving relators 
access to information that could substantiate their claims, and at 
the same time, control court and defendant costs.126  Courts could 
ensure that patient privacy is secure by placing requested records 
under seal and controlling the number of records reviewed.127  
Although this solution is workable, it would still not provide the 
government with a robust ability to recoup funds fraudulently paid 
and it would only offer a solution for a portion of healthcare fraud 
cases.  As such, this author proffers the solution below.   
B. Proposed Solution
After duly considering the case law and opinions of other
authors, this Article suggests that a change in legislation is needed. 
As proposed, new FCA legislation would allow administrative 
agencies, such as CMS or healthcare fraud task forces, to work with 
a qui tam relator should the court decide that the relator has not 
pleaded fraud with sufficient particularity. Under the FCA, the 
government currently can  
elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy 
available to the Government, including any administrative 
proceeding to determine a civil money penalty . . . .  [T]he 
person initiating the action shall have the same rights in 
123. Id.
124. See id. at 244.
125. Bloodgood, supra note 28, at 1464 (“Provided that judges can be
persuaded that the peculiarities of fraud in the health care sector warrant an 
alternative framework for decisionmaking during the pre-trial phase, 
particularity discovery designed to help a qui tam plaintiff satisfy a stricter 
reading of Rule 9(b) is a feasible middle ground to resolve the circuit split.”). 
126. Id. at 1456–58.
127. See id.
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such a proceeding as such a person would have had if the 
action had continued under [section 3730].128  
While it may seem that the law already covers this proposed 
solution, there is a complication in the nexus between the FCA and 
the qui tam statute—administrative agencies cannot enforce the 
FCA:  
The FCA is a litigation statute, which is distinct from the 
other fraud and abuse statutes such as the Civil Monetary 
Penalties Law in two important ways: (1) FCA cases will 
always be prosecuted in federal court, where the express 
language of a statute will be strictly construed in 
accordance with the rules of civil procedure; and (2) unlike 
the four other major Medicare fraud and abuse statutes 
(Stark Law, the Anti-Kickback Statute, Civil Monetary 
Penalties Law (CMPL), and the Exclusionary Statute), 
Congress did not “enable” the so-called alphabet agencies 
(e.g., the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
DOJ, and the OIG) to adopt U.S. Code of Federal 
Regulations concerning the FCA . . . .  Interpretation of the 
elements of the FCA, if any, must come from the courts, or 
amendments to the Act by Congress.129 
Thus, even though under section 3730 relators should be able to 
pursue their claims in the administrative arena, the statute under 
which they are bringing their claims prohibits them from doing so 
by making the judicial system the exclusive means of resolving such 
disputes.   
Amending the FCA would be a great departure from the 
current state of the law.  However, given the rampant amount of 
fraud throughout our healthcare system, it is imperative that tax 
dollars not go to waste in paying providers for fraudulent CMS 
claims.  While the proposed solution may invite additional claims, 
it would allow administrative agencies to pursue such suits, and the 
recoupment of funds by the government cannot be overlooked.  This 
Article’s proposed solution would work well in cases such as 
Clausen and Nathan where the claims likely would have survived 
128. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012).
129. Merritt & Rose, supra note 3, at 63.
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in a more lenient circuit and potentially resulted in millions of 
dollars returned to the government.  
While CMS and other administrative agencies have limited 
resources in their ability to find fraud, their discretion in pursuing 
actions against those committing fraud would be much more robust 
under the proposed solution.  By allowing relators to bring their 
concerns to the courts, or in the alternative, an administrative 
agency that is designed to safeguard the integrity of our healthcare 
system, taxpayers and patients both stand to benefit. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, healthcare fraud is rampant throughout the 
United States healthcare system. Hospitals, pharmaceutical 
companies, medical supply companies, medical technology 
companies, and even doctors and nurses have a valid interest in 
maintaining their revenue and profit streams.  Nevertheless, 
companies and providers that cross the line from legitimate care to 
fraudulent billing should be held accountable for their actions.  As 
the Supreme Court has declined to resolve the discord among the 
circuits concerning the appropriate pleading standard for alleged 
healthcare fraud under the FCA, a change is necessary to ensure 
that relators have alternative means to rectify the injustice that 
they witness in the system.   
An extrajudicial process would provide such an alternative 
avenue for redress in the event that a court declines to review a 
relator’s claim for failure to plead with particularity pursuant to 
Rule 9(b).  This would maximize recoupment of government funds 
thus benefitting all interested parties. 
